Market mechanisms solve distributed scheduling problems by allocating the scheduled r esources according to market prices. We model distributed scheduling as a discrete resource a l l o cation problem, and demonstrate the applicability of economic analysis to this framework. Drawing on results from the literature, we discuss the existence of equilibrium prices for some general classes of scheduling problems, and the quality of equilibrium solutions. We then present two auction protocols for implementing solutions, and analyze their computational and economic properties.
Introduction
Solving scheduling problems with and for distributed computing systems presents particular challenges attributable to the distributed nature of the computation. Consider, for instance, the problem of scheduling network access to programs representing various users on the Internet. In such a n e n vironment, system modules user programs represent independent entities users with con icting and competing scheduling requirements, and may possess localized information relevant to their tasks. To recognize this independence, we treat the modules as agents, ascribing each of them autonomy to decide how to deploy resources under their control in service of their interests.
Within this model, a distributed scheduling method can be analyzed according to how w ell it exhibits the following properties:
Self-interested agents can make e ective decisions with local private information|without knowing the private information and strategies of other agents.
The method requires minimal communication overhead.
Solutions do not waste resources. If there is some way to make some agents better o without harming others, it should be done. A solution that cannot be improved in this way is called Pareto optimal. In some settings, it might be appropriate to adopt some stronger optimality criteria, based on a judgment about social value of the various agents.
Straightforward distributed scheduling policies| such as rst-come rst-served, shortest-job-rst, priority-rst, and combinations thereof|do not generally possess these properties. For example, queueposition schemes are insensitive to relative v alue based on the substance of the task being performed. On the other hand, priority-based schemes beg the question of how to set priorities so that desirable results follow. If self-interested agents are free to set their own priorities, then without some incentive to the contrary, they will specify maximum priority for whatever they are interested in.
Citing such limitations, several have proposed that distributed resource allocation problems be solved via market mechanisms 4 , an approach we have called market-oriented programming MOP 24 . In MOP, we de ne agent activities in terms of resources required and produced, reducing an agent's decision problem to evaluating the tradeo s of acquiring different resources. These tradeo s are represented in terms of market prices, which de ne a common scale of value across the various resources. The problem for designers of computational markets is to specify the con guration of resources traded formally designated goods in the market, and the mechanism by which agent i n teractions determine prices.
Assuming that a scheduling problem must be decentralized, markets can provide several advantages:
Markets are naturally distributed. Agents make their own decisions about how to bid based on the prices and their own relative v aluations of the goods.
Communication is limited to the exchange of bids and prices between agents and the market mechanism. In particular settings, it can be shown that price systems minimize the dimensionality of messages required to determine Pareto optimal allocations 8 .
Since agents must back their representations with exchange o ers, some mechanisms can elicit the information necessary to achieve P areto and system optima or come within some tolerance of optimal in some well-characterized situations. Of course, all of these bene ts do not automatically accrue as a result of setting up a market-like environment. Prior work applying market-inspired mechanisms to scheduling 2, 18, 21, 22 and other distributed computing problems 4 has produced promising empirical results. Understanding the scope of these methods, and developing a general design methodology for computational markets, however, requires an analytical characterization of their properties. In our own MOP work, we have adopted the framework of general equilibrium theory 10 , and have found that our computational markets behave predictably when conditions of the theory are met 14, 24 . We have also applied the approach to discrete optimization problems|where the conditions guaranteeing desirable outcomes are not satis ed| and have found not surprisingly that the methods sometimes work, and other times break down 25 .
Since scheduling problems very often involve discrete indivisible resource units, we h a ve undertaken to analyze directly the behavior of computational market mechanisms for such problems. We start by de ning a general class of discrete allocation problems, and characterizing some distinctions particularly meaningful in the scheduling domain. We show h o w some recent results in economic theory apply to the scheduling problem, and report our own extensions and analysis.
In the next section, we motivate the work with a concrete example of a simple factory scheduling problem. In Section 3, we provide a formal economic model of a general version of the problem, and in Section 4 we relate some equilibrium and optimality properties associated with the problem. In Section 5, we brie y describe a general framework for auction protocols, and describe and analyze two protocols in Sections 6 and 7. Finally, w e consider future work in Section 8.
A Factory Scheduling Economy
Consider a factory with an unscheduled day shift. There are eight one-hour time slots, labeled 9:00 to 16:00 according to their respective end times. Slots can be allocated for the production of customer orders. The factory has a reserve price for each time Figure 1 : A factory scheduling economy. Lines connecting the agents to time slots represent one feasible allocation.
slot, representing the minimum price that the factory is willing to accept in exchange for that time slot. Assume each customer agent has one job it wants completed. An agent's job is de ned by its duration length, its deadline, and the value expressed in dollars the agent places on the job. An agent is willing to spend up to this value to complete its job. To d o s o , the agent m ust acquire a number of slots no less than the length not necessarily contiguous, no later than the deadline. The agent gets no value if its job cannot be completed before its deadline. The value of a solution is the sum of values of the agents holding the goods, which i s t h e s u m o f t h e reserve price for each time slot that was not sold, plus the value associated with each customer agent that meets its job deadline.
Example 1
The agents are shown in Figure 1 . 1 Since the sum of lengths exceeds available factory time, it is not possible for all of the agents to produce their orders. The allocation depicted in Figure 1 r epresents a system optimum.
Given an assignment of prices to goods, we can dene an agent's optimal choice as a set of slots that complete the job at the minimum cost, or the empty set if the the job could not not be completed for less than its value. The reader can verify that at the prices shown in Figure 1 , each a g e n t m a k es a locally optimal choice in the globally optimal allocation.
Formal Model of the Scheduling Economy
We de ne a general discrete resource allocation problem in terms of the following elements:
G, a set of n discrete goods, A, a s e t o f m agents, and ? representing the seller or null agent, prices p = hp 1 ; : : : ; p n i.
We assume that agents have quasilinear utility functions, meaning that their valuations can be measured in terms of a common numeraire, which for convenience can be taken to be money". Therefore, we can directly compare the utility of di erent agents, and meaningfully treat the sum as a measure of global value. Agent j gets utility v j X + M j for holding the set of goods X, X G, and M j units of money.
Let H j p denote the maximum surplus value achievable by agent j at prices p. That is,
Note that, for some prices, an agent m a y maximize its surplus with the empty set.
A solution is a mapping f : G ! A f?g, indicating which a g e n t, if any, gets eachgood. Let F j f ijfi = jg denote the set of goods allocated to agent j and F ? f ijfi = ?g denote the set of unallocated goods in f.
The seller of good i has utility equal to its reserve value q i if the good is unallocated, or the money it receives for the good if it is allocated. Intuitively, t h e reserve value denotes the value to the owner, or the system", of not allocating the good to any agent. Di erent time slots could potentially have di erent reserve v alues; for instance, a factory may h a ve a higher reserve price for evening hours to cover overtime expenses.
The global or system value of a solution, vf, is the sum of the agent v alues achieved and the reserve value of goods not used by a g e n ts, 2 vf X i2F ?
We measure the system value of a solution ex post, that is, conditional on knowing all agents' valuations. 3 A solution is optimal if no other solution has higher value.
In Sections 6 and 7 we present auction protocols for this very general resource allocation problem. However, the theoretical results and examples we present focus on particular subclasses of scheduling problems where each a g e n t has one job to complete. For these problems, we associate each a g e n t j with a job length Intuitively, this de nition states that, in equilibrium, each agent gets an allocation that maximizes its utility given the current prices. Equilibria sometime exist, and are generally not unique. Consider Example 1. The solution shown, with only agent 3 receiving no goods, is in equilibrium at the set of prices suggested, with slots 9:00, 10:00, and 11:00 each having a price of $6.25, and all other slots having a price of $3.25. The same solution is also in equilibrium with respective prices of $6.50 and $3.35, and many other combinations. The equilibrium solution has value $40.50, which is optimal. Indeed it had to be, as demonstrated by the following result.
Theorem 1 For the general discrete resource a l l o cation problem, if there exists a p such that f is in equilibrium at p, t h e n f is an optimal solution.
Proof. Bikhchandani and Mamer provide a proof for an exchange economy without reserve prices 3 . The extension to account for reserve v alues is straightfor- Table 1 : A problem with no equilibrium. Adapted from a demonstration 12 that price equilibria may not exist in the FCC market for radio spectrum.
are possible and so the result is Pareto optimal. Since we assume that agent values are expressible in price units, Pareto optimality corresponds to global optimality.
Example 2 There a r e two agents as described i n T able 1, and the reserve price o f e ach good is zero.
The optimal solution, f1 = f2 = 1, is not in equilibrium at any prices, and indeed no equilibrium exists in this case. If p were i n e quilibrium, then p 1 $2 and p 2 $2, otherwise agent 2 would demand one of the goods. But if these inequalities hold then agent 1 would not demand the two time slots it requires.
In this example, the nonexistence of equilibrium prices is due to complementarities in agent preferences. Agent 1 considers the two time slots complementary in that it values one i it has the other. Complementarities cannot arise in the single-unit scheduling problem.
Lemma 2 The single-unit scheduling problem always has a unique minimum equilibrium price v e ctor.
Proof. An exchange economy c haracterized by quasilinear utilities for single goods always has a unique minimum equilibrium price vector 17 . The singleunit scheduling problem is a subclass of this type of economy. 2 Theorem 3 Any optimal solution to the single-unit scheduling problem xed or variable deadline is supported by a price e quilibrium.
Proof. By Lemma 2, the single-unit scheduling problem always has at least one price equilibrium p. By Theorem 1, p supports an optimal solution. Since p supports an optimal solution, it can be shown that all optimal solutions mu s t b e s u p p o r t e d b y p 3, 7 . 2
Together, Theorems 1 and 3 establish that a solution to the single-unit scheduling problem is optimal i it is supported by a price equilibrium. Example 2 demonstrates that relaxing the single-unit restriction immediately leads to the possibility that an equilibrium will not exist.
In addition to the single-unit restriction of Theorem 3, we can identify a few other conditions that guarantee the existence of equilibrium. If all agents have additive preferences over goods then an equilibrium exists. 4 Additive preferences is a su cient c o ndition for gross substitutability | if the price for one good goes up, demand does not go down for any o t h e r good|which in turn guarantees the existence of equilibrium 9 . Bikhchandani and Mamer 3 present some other technical conditions for existence of equilibrium, which do not seem to be immediately expressible in scheduling terms.
Auction Protocols
We use the term protocol to refer to a mechanism, along with agent bidding policies. The mechanisms we consider are generically called auctions. McAfee and McMillan provide the following de nition 11 :
An auction is a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the market participants.
This de nition includes the well known English openoutcry and rst-price sealed bid auctions|commonly used to sell art and to award procurement c o n tracts, respectively|as well as a broad range of other mechanisms, including xed pricing, Dutch auction, Vickrey auction, commodities markets, and the ascending and Generalized Vickrey auctions described in Sections 6 and 7, respectively.
In order to place greater structure on the space of mechanisms, and also to provide a common interface to agents, we de ne a somewhat restricted, but still very general auction protocol. 
In order to predict auction outcomes, we m ust consider the agents' presumed bidding policies, which i n turn are based on our model of their beliefs and preferences. With some auctions we are able to determine analytically that a particular bidding policy is part of a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium or even the dominant strategy. With other auctions we rely on experimentation and rules of thumb based on economic principles to determine reasonable bidding policies.
Our analysis is from the standard noncooperative perspective, which assumes that agents do not directly coordinate their bidding. Collusion has been an issue in the FCC spectrum auctions; anti-collusion measures are considered by Milgrom 13 .
The auction mechanisms we discuss are distributed in the sense that each agent calculates its own bid strategy, based on local information. The ascending auction can be further distributed in that allocations for each good can be computed separately.
Ascending Auction
We de ne the ascending auction protocol for the general discrete resource allocation problem. Separate auctions determine prices for each o f the goods. Agents submit successively higher bids to the auctions, and auctions immediately report price quotes to all interested agents upon receiving a bid. When the bidding stops, each auction allocates its respective good to the highest bidder at the price the agent bid, or the good is retained by the seller if there are no bids.
Bidding Rules
At any p o i n t in time, the bid price in the auction for good i, denoted i , is the highest bid in the auction thus far. If auction i has received no bids, i is unde ned. Auction i's ask price, denoted i , i s i + , for some xed , if i is de ned. Otherwise, the ask price is q i .
The ascending auction rejects any bid less than its ask price. Agents are not allowed to withdraw bids. An agent may replace its bid with another, but the new bid must be at least the current ask price. These rules guarantee that prices do not decrease and that the bidding process terminates.
Agent Bidding Policies
When an agent j enters the market, it bids the ask prices for the set of goods, X, that maximizes its surplus H j , based on the current ask prices breaking ties arbitrarily. As other agents continue to bid, agent j may lose some of its bids. When this occurs, j bids the ask price on the set of goods that maximizes its surplus, assuming that it must pay for the goods it is currently winning. For the single-unit scheduling problem, whenever an agent is not already winning a bid, it simply bids the ask price for the single good that maximizes its surplus at the ask prices. If no good would provide it with a positive surplus, then the agent drops out" of the auction.
This bidding strategy is quite simple, involving no anticipation of other agents' strategies. For the singleunit problem, such a n ticipation is unnecessary, a s t h e agent w ould not wish to change its bid even after observing what the other agents did. This is called the no regret property 3 , and means that from the agent's perspective, no bidding policy would have been a better response to the other agents' bids. The no-regret property does not hold, however, for the ascending auction in the multi-unit scheduling problem, regardless of the bidding strategy 3 . In general, an agent might perform better, for example, through accurate prediction of the other agents' behavior. In the absence of a basis for prediction, however, the simple strategy proposed may indeed be reasonable.
Analysis of the Ascending Auction
Let p i denote the price paid for i. Under the ascending auction rules, when the auction closes, p i = i if de ned, otherwise p i = q i .
It is possible that the ascending auction can determine prices that di er from an equilibrium of a multiple-unit scheduling economy b y arbitrarily large amounts.
Example 3 The bid increment is = $ 1 and the reserve prices are z e r o. The agents are described i n T able 2.
Although there a r e many equilibrium price sets one of which is p 1 = $ 8 , p 2 = $ 8 , and p 3 = $ 1 , the ascending auction may not nd an equilibrium. Agent 2 could bid up good 3 until 3 $2 while it and agent 1 both bid up the prices on 1 and 2. verify that any equilibrium must have agent 3 winning good 3 at a price n o g r eater than $2.
In the multiple-unit scheduling problem, the ascending auction can produce allocations that are arbitrarily far from optimal.
Example 4 There are two agents as shown in Table 3. Reserve prices are q 1 = $ 1 and q 2 = $ 9 , and the bid increment is = $ 1 .
If agent 2 places its bids rst, it will bid $1 for 1 and $9 for 2. Agent 1 will then bid $2 for 1. The bidding will stop with good 1 a l l o cated to agent 1 and good 2 a l l o cated to agent 2. This solution has a value of $3 yet the optimal solution, with 2 unallocated, has a value of $12. It is easy to see|by increasing q 2 and v 2 by the same amount|that the ascending auction can produce a solution that is arbitrarily far from optimal.
If we restrict each agent's requirement to a single time slice, then by Theorem 3 an equilibrium exists. However, the ascending auction protocol is not guaranteed to reach an equilibrium even with this restriction. Consider the following economy.
Example 5 The bid increment is = $ 1 . The reserve prices are q 1 = $ 4 , q 2 = $ 3 , and q 3 = $ 3 . The agents are described i n T able 4.
It is possible that agent 2 may bid rst, for 2. Then 2 = $ 4 . Agent 1 will then bid $4 for either 1 or 2. If it bids for 1 then the bidding will stop and agent 1 will win 1 for $4 and agent 2 will win 2 for $3. But since p 2 = $ 3 p 1 , agent 1 would maximize its surplus by demanding 2 at the nal prices. However, the bidding rules prohibit any readjustment towards an equilibrium. The auction does not allow agent 1 to withdraw its bid for 1, and hence the nal allocation violates condition 1 of the de nition of equilibrium.
Name
Job Length Deadline Value Agent 1 1 2 $6 Agent 2 1 3 $7 It is not hard to see that the potential failure to reach equilibrium can be demonstrated for any positive v alue of , no matter how small. Nevertheless, unlike the multiple-unit problem, we can bound the distance from the equilibrium price vector by , where = m i n n; m.
Theorem 4 For the variable-deadline, single-unit scheduling problem, the nal price of any good determined by ascending auction protocol will di er from the unique minimum equilibrium prices by at most .
Proof. Demange et al. prove this result for the ascending auction protocol in an exchange economy where buyers want no more than a single item from a s e t o f a vailable goods 5 . In the single-unit scheduling problem, no agent wishes to obtain more than a single item, hence the result holds for this problem. 2
Consider again Example 5. The solution shown has a value of $16. If agent 1 had received good 2 and agent 2 had received good 3 then the value of the solution would be $17, which is optimal. However, the solution can be suboptimal by only a bounded amount.
Theorem 5 The ascending auction protocol with a given produces a solution to the variable-deadline, single-unit scheduling problem that is suboptimal by at most 1 + .
Proof. Let f be the allocation reached by the ascending auction and f an optimal allocation. p i is the price found for i in the ascending auction, and p i the unique minimum equilibrium price for i recall that Lemma 2 and Theorem 3 established that a unique minimum price vector exists and supports f . Let e i = p i , p i . From Theorem 4 we know that j e i j .
Let F and F be the set of goods allocated in f and f , respectively. To get the error, we can subtract the value of the nal allocation from the optimal allocation.
vf , vf In the single-unit problem, an agent bids for the good that maximizes its surplus. In the solution allocation, this surplus must be at least the surplus it would get from any other good at the ask price, otherwise the agent w ould have bid for that good instead. Therefore, when the ascending auction stops, The computation of the clearing and price quotes is trivial in the ascending auction. Communications costs dominate the run time, which can therefore be measured in terms of the bids required. Because bids increase by a xed increment, the number of iterations is inversely proportional to . Hence, in choosing the value for , we trade o solution value for communication e ciency.
We have shown that the simple bidding policy is reasonable for individual agents, and produces allocations with desirable system properties in the singleunit problem. The results do not provide strong support for this simple policy in the multiple-unit problem. Other strategies, such as jump bidding|where an agent bids in large increments for sets of goods to signal its willingness to aggressively pursue that set| may p r o vide potential advantages to individuals or the system. However, it is an open question as to whether there exists a policy for the ascending auction or any complete protocol that always nds within some tolerance an equilibrium when it exists.
Generalized Vickrey Auction
The ascending auction performs well for single-unit allocation problems. At t h e e n d o f S e c t i o n 3 w e n o t e that the single-unit restriction is only one su cient condition for existence of a price equilibrium. However, even when equilibria exist for a multiple-unit problem, the ascending auction may not nd one, as shown by Example 4. Further, as Example 2 demonstrates, many scheduling problems have optimal, value-maximizing allocations that are not supportable by a n y price equilibrium.
The Generalized Vickrey Auction GVA 19 can implement optimal allocations for a broad class of scheduling problems with multiple goods, multiple units, requirements contingencies, and externalities i.e., values for one agent that depend on the allocations obtained by other agents. The GVA does not use a price system. Rather, it computes payments for agents' allocations that only sometimes, but not always, translate into meaningful prices for individual goods. Thus the GVA can obtain optimality in problems for which a price equilibrium does not exist.
Bidding Rules for the GVA
The GVA is a direct revelation mechanism. Agents report utility functions in their bids, rather than pricequantity points. Recall that v j is agent j's actual utility function. Each agent announcesv j , its alleged utility function. The circum exes are used to indicate that the agent is not constrained to be truthful, that is, it may be thatv j 6 = v j . The auction knows the reserve values, q i . After receiving the bids, the GVA returns an allocation, and a vector of positive o r negative p a yments to be made to the agents.
Allocation Rules for the GVA
Recall that a solution is a mapping f, and the value of a solution is given by vf. The auction mechanism: The W ,j component represents the total reported value for agents other than j at the solution f . The residual payment P j could be any function of other agents' reported valuations. However, we restrict attention here to the function described in 6. j + W ,j f . Therefore, if the agent bids truthfully v j = v j , it receives the auction mechanism's maximand less a constant recall P j is unaffected by a g e n t j's bid. Clearly the agent can do no better than to get the auction to maximize its true value. Thus, for a rational agent, truthful bidding dominates all other strategies.
Optimality Analysis of the GVA
If all agents behave rationally, then since the GVA is incentive compatible, they bid truthfully. The GVA computes the optimal allocation based on the bids, and since all bids are truthful, the allocation is system optimal.
The GVA s o l v es problems with multiple units, and problems without a price equilibrium. Example 2 above has both features: Example 6 From Example 2 If the agents truthfully report their value functions, the auction mechanism nds the optimal solution f : f 1 = f 2 = 1 . It then calculates W ,1 = 0 and W ,2 = 3. Agent 1 receives total value 3 + 0 , P 1 , and agent 2 receives 0 + 3 , P 2 . No untruthful bid can increase these payo s, so the agents should bid truthfully. The condition that v j F j + V j 0 requires that P j 3 for j 2 f 1; 2g; otherwise, rational agents would choose not to participate in the auction. Thus, P 1 = 2 agent 1 pays $2, P 2 = 3 agent 2 pays $0, and the mechanism has a net revenue of $2.
Limitations on the GVA
A mechanism is individually rational if no agent can be worse o from participating in the auction than if it had declined to participate. A mechanism is budget balanced if the net payment over all agents is nonnegative. Generally, these, along with optimality, a r e the properties we desire when agents play their equilibrium strategies in a mechanism. In our scheduling problem we can obtain all three using P j from 6. The payment function V j P j transfers to agent j the net value increment to all other agents that results from j's participation in the auction. Agent j's only e ect on others is that it may get time slices that others desire, so its participation always makes other agents weakly worse o . Thus, V j is nonpositive for all j, and the auction mechanism runs a surplus.
Theorem 7 If the GVA uses the payment function W ,j , P j then the individual rationality constraint is satis ed and the net monetary payments to the auction mechanism are nonnegative.
However, the problem statement assumes that the auction mechanism knows the reserve v alues q i . If instead the q i are the private information of seller agents, then no mechanism can obtain more than two o u t o f the three desired properties. Myerson and Satterthwaite 15 p r o ved this impossibility theorem for bilateral exchange problems, some of which are scheduling problems with seller agents. Example 7 Bilateral exchange Suppose there i s one buyer, who has a single-unit job with deadline 1 and value v. Let the seller be an agent, with reserve value q 1 . Suppose v q 1 . The GVA would induce truthful reporting of v and q 1 , give the good to the buyer, require the buyer to pay q 1 , and pay v to the seller. Although the mechanism is individually rational and would produce the optimal allocation, the auction would run a de cit of v , q 1 .
We can always use the GVA to obtain individual rationality and optimality, but with an auction de cit, by setting, for example, P j = 0. Alternatively, the GVA can obtain optimality and budget balance by setting a su ciently high P j , which, however, makes it irrational for some agents to participate.
GVA Computation
As a baseline for computational e ciency, w e n o t e that Neapolitan and Naimipour 16 s h o w that a simple centralized greedy algorithm solves the single-unit, xed-deadline scheduling problem optimally, in time m lg m. The GVA mechanism must solve m ultiple optimization problems to process the bids, one to determine the optimal allocation, and one for each a g e n t j with its bid removed to determine P j . For a singleunit, xed-deadline problem we can use the centralized algorithm for each optimization, with a total runtime of m 2 lg m. Thus, inducing preference revelation and thereby obtaining full optimality raises the auction cost by a factor of m; this is the computational cost of distributing the problem via the straightforward implementation of the GVA. If we remove the single-unit restriction, then any centralized algorithm that can solve the scheduling problem optimally can solve the Integer Knapsack problem. Hence the multiple-unit scheduling problem is NP-Complete. 5 By the preceding argument, distributing the multiple-unit problem via the GVA contributes a factor of m to the computation.
Discussion
We have presented two auction mechanisms that can compute optimal or near-optimal solutions to the single-unit distributed scheduling problem in a computationally e cient manner. The multiple-unit problem is signi cantly more di cult and entails a sharper tradeo among solution quality, computational eciency, and the degree to which the mechanism is distributed. The computation performed by the ascending auction is trivial, and can be distributed bygoods.
